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Abstract 
Contrary to what the literature on the linkage between debt accumulation and hidden economy 
suggests, this paper advocates that the two relationships, tax-hidden economy size and inflation-hidden 
economy size, have to be inverse because it is the relative, not the absolute hidden economy size that 
matters, and it is this that should be the yardstick for empirical work on the subject. It is also this that 
should be the yardstick for policymaking against debt accumulation by following the anti-austerity 
policy recipe that debt manipulation should be relying more on money than on taxation, that as soon as 
more money facilitates hidden activities, tax design should be counteracting this trend too, and that the 
Laffer curve should be peaking at an average tax rate which is less than one. This rule derives as a 
matter of preserving such official-cum-hidden economy technical-cum-allocative efficiency over the 
course of the business cycle that keeps the overall economy always in general equilibrium.  
Keywords: Public debt, Non-observed/Hidden sector, Taxation, Income elasticity of money demand, 
Structural efficiency 
JEL Codes: E26, E61, H63, E32 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to the United Nations’ (2008) definition of the non-observed or hidden economy, this 
economy consists of underground, illegal, and informal activities, activities undertaken by households 
for their final use, and deficiencies in the basic data collection systems. Assuming away statistical 
deficiencies, these are all activities weakening tax collection, and prompting in turn government budget 
deficits, and an increase in money supply and/or government borrowing to cover the deficit. And, if 
such borrowing persists it becomes public debt, obtaining a clear-cut direct relationship between 
hidden economy and debt accumulation. Analytically, this inplies that as Bovi and Claeys (2007, 1) 
point out: “The budget constraint makes the relation between the [hidden] economy, taxes and 
spending inherently dynamic.” And, from the viewpoint of empirical findings, as Uras and Elgin (2013, 
628) document: “a larger size of the [hidden economy] is associated with (1) higher public 
indebtedness, (2) higher interest rates paid on sovereign debt, (3) a higher level of  financial instability 
and (4) a higher probability of sovereign default. 
But, these are the only two points about which there is consensus in the relevant literature. They are 
two major points indeed, but there are two other equally significant points where opinion differs. 
Mazhar and Méon (2012, 1) maintain that there is “a negative relation between the tax burden and the 
size of the shadow economy, and a positive relation between inflation and the size of the shadow 
economy”. Although Cukierman et al. (1992) and Huang and Wei (2006) appear to rationalize this 
claim about the relationship between inflation and hidden economy size, Ihrig and Moe (2004) or 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) argue the opposite about the relationship between size and taxation. And, in 
what follows, this paper agrees with Mazhar and Méon (2012) and disagrees with Ihrig and Moe (2004) 
or Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) about the “tax-size” relationship, and disagrees with Mazhar and Méon 
(2012) about the “inflation-size” relationship in so far as political stability rather than instability a la 
Cukierman et al. (1992) and Huang and Wei (2006) is the case. 
More specifically, increased seigniorage does make easier hidden economy transactions, since they are 
carried out mostly in terms of cash to remain undetected by the authorities (Tanzi 1983). But, equally 
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easier become official economy transactions, total output increases, and there is an optimal official-
unofficial economy mix such that the relative size of the unofficial one declines though the absolute 
size may very well be increasing. This optimality of the mix refers to structural, technical-cum-
allocative efficiency, which is ignored by Mazhar and Méon (2012), and which once disturbed by 
increased taxation hurting official-economy production, it is restored through a decline in the hidden 
economy due to the diminishing returns of the resources redirected from the official to the hidden 
economy. The two relationships, tax-hidden economy size and inflation-hidden economy size, have to 
be inverse because it is the relative, not the absolute hidden economy size that matters, and it is this that 
should be the yardstick for empirical work on the subject. 
It is also this, the relative size, which should be of concern to policymaking, because in a recession, for 
instance, both economy types are expected to be shrinking in absolute size; and the alleged 
countercyclicality of the hidden economy should be taken to mean that things would have been much 
worse if there were no hidden economy from the point of view of increase in its relative size. This 
brings us to the other point of disagreement in the literature about the nexus between debt and hidden 
economy; namely, whether the hidden economy is countercyclical or amplifies the observed, the 
official-economy cycle. Granda-Carvajal (2012) is among the few advocating the “cycle amplification” 
point of view, based on additively separable preferences with respect to official and unofficial labor. 
Nevertheless, it is not plausible to be postulating that the decision to work in one sector does not 
influence the decision to do so in the other sector. Indeed,  Schioppa (1994, 1) observes that Italy: “is 
developing thanks to what the Italians call ‘l'arte d'arrangiarsi’, their generalized talent for 
improvisation…”; improvisation in the realm of the underground economy as a response to: “drastic 
budgetary cuts aiming at curbing public debt to maintain sustainability”, she means. And, Busato et al. 
(2012, 1) note that: “The underground sector mitigates the distortionary impact of fiscal policies, while 
lessening the drop (rise) of aggregate production after contractionary (expansionary) tax shift.” These 
are two only pieces from the bulk of evidence in support of the hidden economy’s countercyclicality, 
which involves a “double business cycle” of opposite cyclicality as advanced originally by Busato and 
Chiarini (2004), and as advocated below as well. 
This paper reports the results of a study on the issue of appropriate policymaking against debt 
accumulation in the presence of hidden economy. Any policy proposal against sovereign debt crises is 
reasonable to dictate inter alia the subjugation of the hidden sector as a means of enhancing the tax 
base; much more so when the austerity underpinning such a policy strengthens the incentive(s) to “go 
unofficial”.1 The next section concludes that the relationship between the average tax rate, 𝜏, and the 
official-sector income elasticity of money demand, 𝑏, emerges to be one critical component of such a 
policy. The optimal policymaking against debt accumulation involves the rule 𝜏 < 𝑏 once the debt is 
not monetized. The parameter 𝑏 is the inverse of the velocity of money circulation, which when 
judging from the quantity equation in growth terms, is inversely related to the inflation rate and to real 
output growth, and directly related to money growth. Therefore, the meaning of the rule  𝜏 < 𝑏 is 
triple: First, that the Laffer curve should be peaking at some 𝜏 < 1, second that debt manipulation 
should be relying more on money than on taxation, and third, that as soon as more money facilitates 
hidden activities, tax design should be counteracting this trend.2  
Next, section 3 attributes the “third anti-debt” property of the proposed fiscal-monetary policy mix to 
the improvement that this mix brings about to the structural efficiency conditions surrounding the 
official and hidden sectors within the context of the overall economy. This efficiency is defined in line 
with Anandalingam and Kulatilaka (1987) given Brada’s (1992) criteria. And, within the particular 
theoretical construct worked out below, it is manifested through Laffer-Gutmann curve considerations 
acknowledging the symmetric role of tax rate and tax base changes in determining tax revenue (Moszer 
1981, Barnett II and Block 2005, Bartlett 2012). Referring to this curve just with the term “Laffer 
curve”, its shape is found to be decided by the returns to scale prevailing in either or both sectors in a 
fashion echoing the evidence by Friedman et al. (2000, Abstract) that: “higher tax rates are associated 
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with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP”.3 What the rule  𝜏 < 𝑏  subsequently means as a 
policy prescription against debt accumulation, is that it helps increase the denominator of the debt-to-
income ratio and decrease the numerator by improving structural efficiency.  
It is a rule when debt is not monetized, preserving such structural efficiency over the course of the 
business cycle that keeps the overall economy always in general equilibrium, and holding under the 
condition that the probability of hidden activity detection should be at most equal to the income 
elasticity of the hidden-economy money demand. This is a condition closely related with hidden-
economy motivation. This paper concludes with a section in connection with this matter. It is argued 
that once the subject of the unofficial economy is disassociated from the matter of corruption, the 
contribution of this economy to the struggle against debt accumulation is one of its merits. All the more 
when it appears as such to be the only viable anti-debt alternative to the alleged “orthodoxy” of fiscal 
consolidation and austerity! 
 
2. Hidden Economy, Public Debt Dynamics, and Policymaking 
 
Let total output, 𝑌, consist of the observed, official output, 𝑌𝑓, and the part coming out of the hidden 
sector, 𝑌𝑢, so that: 𝑌 = 𝑌𝑓 + 𝑌𝑢.  Also, let  𝑝 be the frequency probability of detecting hidden income so 
that the income reported, 
?̂? = 𝑌𝑓 + 𝑝𝑌𝑢 .    (1) 
Hence, tax revenue is: 
 
𝜏?̂? = 𝜏𝑌𝑓 + 𝜏𝑝𝑌𝑢    (2) 
 
where 𝜏 is the average tax rate. Although the assumption of such a tax rate is not realistic, ?̂? is what 
actually the statistical service reports, disregarding the fact that part of it has originated in the hidden 
sector with the probability 𝑝 enforced by the authorities appointed to be tracking this sector’s activities 
down. Consequently, what is novel analytically with the discussion below is the incorporation of 𝑝 into 
the standard approach to the public debt. It is a task, which to the author’s knowledge, has not been 
undertaken so far.  
 
Now, let us continue with the equilibrium condition in the money market: 
 
𝑀𝑠 = 𝑏𝑌𝑓 + 𝑘𝑌𝑢 − 𝑒𝑟   (3) 
 
where 𝑀𝑠 is the supply of money, the right-hand side of (3) is the demand for real cash balances, 𝑟 is 
the interest rate identified with the rate of return to capital in the official economy, 𝑒 = 𝜕𝑀𝑠 𝜕𝑟⁄ , and 𝑏 
and 𝑘 are Pigou’s constants, decimals, with 𝑏 > 𝑘 for hidden transactions are carried out mostly in cash 
to remain undetected. Coefficients 𝑏 and 𝑘 reflect inverse velocities of circulation so that if the official 
and hidden velocities are say 4 and 5, respectively, the corresponding inverses will be 0.25 and 0.20. In 
the decomposition of the overall velocity, we follow Werner (2012). At steady state, (in the long-run), 
𝑏, 𝑘, and 𝑒, may be seen as the elasticity of money demand with respect to steady state 𝑌𝑓,  𝑌𝑢, and the 
interest rate, while an increase in 𝑀𝑠 will lead to a decrease in 𝑟 so that 𝜕𝑀𝑠 𝜕𝑡⁄ = −𝑒𝑟, where 𝑡 is 
time.  
 
And, in so far as the public debt, 𝐵, is concerned, its course through time is: 
 
𝑀𝑡
𝑠 = 𝐺𝑡−1 − 𝜏?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡 − (𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1) + 𝑀𝑡−1
𝑠   (4) 
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where 𝐺 is government expenditure. Inserting (3) in (4) and manipulating terms yields the following 
difference equation in 𝐵: 
 
(1 − 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑒(𝑟𝑡−𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑏𝑌𝑓,𝑡 + (𝑏 − 𝜏)𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1 − 𝑘(𝑌𝑢,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑢,𝑡−1].   (5) 
 
The steady state where the change in 𝑌𝑓 and 𝑌𝑢 is nil, is given by the particular integral: 
 
?̅? =
(1 − 𝑟)(𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟 − 𝜏𝑌𝑓 − 𝑏𝑌𝑓 − 𝑘𝑌𝑢)
2 − 𝑟
,     (6) 
 
which implies that a government budget balanced by money financed deficits is required to keep the 
debt equal to zero: 
 
?̅? = 0 ⇔ 𝐺 = 𝜏𝑌𝑓 + 𝑏𝑌𝑓 + 𝑘𝑌𝑢 − 𝑒𝑟 ⇔ 𝐺 = 𝜏𝑌𝑓 + 𝑀   (7) 
 
where 𝑀 captures now the money-financed part of government expenditure beyond the tax-financed 
part. Presumably, at steady state, the mix 𝑌𝑓 − 𝑌𝑢 is optimal and 𝑝 should be equal to zero, implying 
steady state tax revenue equal to 𝜏𝑌𝑓. The point is that a zero-debt does not necessarily presume a 
balanced budget, a 𝐺 = 𝜏𝑌𝑓, as is commonly argued; a money-only financed deficit is enough, 
reminding Old Chicago’s School urge against open market operations (see e.g. Friedman 1948), and 
recently, deLong and Summers’ (2012) suggestions for a self-financed-fiscal-policy against debt 
problems. Once government borrowing starts taking place, debt will start piling up explosively as the 
rate of increase (1 − 𝑟)−𝑡 in the complementary function suggests unless 𝑟 > 1.  
 
Debt accumulation need not trigger income fluctuations, since from (1 − 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1 = 0 in (5), the 
following difference equation in 𝑌𝑓 is given rise: 
 
𝑏𝑌𝑓,𝑡 − (𝑏 − 𝜏)𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑒(𝑟𝑡−𝑟𝑡−1) − 𝑘(𝑌𝑢,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑢,𝑡−1],   (8) 
 
with fluctuations given by [(𝑏 − 𝜏) 𝑏]⁄
𝑡
 around the steady state: 
 
?̅?𝑓 =
𝑏[𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟 − 𝑘𝑌𝑢]
2𝑏 − 𝜏
.    (9) 
 
Setting 𝑏 = 𝜏, fluctuations are zeroed and ?̅?𝑓 = 𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟 − 𝑘𝑌𝑢  (9′). But, in general, an increasing at a 
rate 𝜑 debt would presuppose an increasing at a rate 𝜓 > 𝜑 income to be having a decreasing 
debt/income ratio, ceteris paribus, which herein is found to be the case when 𝑏 > 𝜏, i.e. when taxation 
is not discouraging the monetary environment surrounding official economy transactions and thereby 
official income generation. Once debt has been accumulated and the accumulation has to be halted and 
reversed, the official and thereby total economy has to undergo business fluctuations. 
 
From another point of view, (8) may be rewritten in the light of (1) as follows: 
 
𝑘(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1) = [𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑒(𝑟𝑡−𝑟𝑡−1)] − (𝑏 − 𝑘)(𝑌𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1) − 𝜏𝑌𝑓,𝑡−1, 
 
with no fluctuations since the complementary function is 1𝑡, and 
 
?̅? = 𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟 + [𝑘 − (𝑏 − 𝜏)]𝑌𝑓 .    (10) 
 
It appears that fluctuations in 𝑌𝑓 and 𝑌𝑢 cancel one another out taking away fluctuations from 𝑌. In the 
presence of debt, (10) indicates that the policy of 𝑏 > 𝜏 would lower ?̅?.  Judging from (9) too, the 
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overall picture regarding the confrontation of a debt problem is one of aggravated sectoral fluctuations 
about a lower steady state. Therefore, it would be prudent policy-wise to be keeping at least money-
only-financed deficits if not a balanced altogether budget as in (7) – which is what here is defined to be 
a zero-debt policy – and to be using the stabilization rule 𝑏 = 𝜏 .  
 
The general conclusion is that once debt has accumulated, it should be monetized as soon as possible 
countering the subsequent output loss exclusively through money financed deficits along with the 
fiscal-monetary stabilization rule of 𝜏 = 𝑏. If debt is not monetized readily, the rule 𝜏 < 𝑏 should be 
adopted rather than the painful alternative of fiscal austerity which would anyway defer monetization. 
This is a matter of sound macroeconomics independently of the institutional background surrounding 
government expenditure and tax collection. An improvement of this background would certainly 
corroborate the whole anti-debt effort, but has merit on its own shake regardless the matter of debt, 
which cannot anyway be confronted based only on such an improvement. But, the derived policy rule 
𝜏 ≤ 𝑏  does depend on the structural efficiency environing the official-unofficial economy nexus. The 
truth of the statement that the subjugation of the hidden, unofficial economy is inescapable as a means 
of increasing tax revenue against public debt problems derives from this precisely perspective. The 
relevant question is: Is the rule 𝜏 ≤ 𝑏 structurally efficient? The next section elaborates upon this 
matter.  
 
3. The Structural Efficiency of the Proposed Policy Rule 
 
The issue of the structural component of the overall-economy efficiency refers to the optimal 𝑌𝑓 − 𝑌𝑢 
mix from the viewpoint of maximum technical and allocative efficiency (see e.g. Anandalingam and 
Kulatilaka, 1987). Once there is a debt problem and once it is neither monetized readily nor fiscal 
austerity is followed but instead the rule 𝜏 < 𝑏 is adopted: Does this rule improves structural efficiency 
and is this efficiency optimized at 𝜏 = 𝑏? Analytically (Brada, 1992), the relevant question is: Is the 
policy mix of 𝜏 < 𝑏 corroborating allocative efficiency given sectoral technical efficiency at its 
optimum? Because, if it does corroborate, it will be much more overall-efficiency enhancing when 
technical efficiency is absent, too.  
 
To tackle this issue as simply as possible, let 𝑌𝑓 = ℎ𝑌 and 𝑌𝑢 = (1 − ℎ)𝑌, 0 < ℎ < 1, so that: 
 
𝑌 = ℎ𝑌 + (1 − ℎ)𝑌.      (12) 
Let also output be produced in either sector according to a Cobb-Douglas technology, i.e. if  ℎ𝑌 = 𝑌𝑓 =
𝐾𝑓
𝛾𝐿𝑓
𝛿   and (1 − ℎ)𝑌 = 𝑌𝑢 = 𝐾𝑢
𝜀𝐿𝑢
𝜂
, where 𝐾 and 𝐿 denote capital and labor, respectively, while 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜀, 
and 𝜂 are positive constants capturing returns to scale. In this formulation, probability 𝑝 is discarded 
because it would only complicate the discussion. To focus on allocative efficiency, we take technical 
efficiency for granted by rewriting production functions in terms of the corresponding output expansion 
path as follows: 
𝑌𝑓 = 𝛷𝐿𝑓
𝛾+𝛿       (13) 
and 
𝑌𝑢 = 𝛹𝐿𝑢
𝜀+𝜂
,      (14) 
where 𝛷 = (𝛾𝑟𝑓 𝛿𝑤𝑓⁄ )
𝛾
 and 𝛹 = (𝜀𝑟𝑢 𝜂𝑤𝑢⁄ )
𝜀, with 𝑟 being the rate of return to 𝐾 and 𝑤 the reward to 
𝐿, assuming of course competitive factor markets, (and identifying the 𝑟 in (3) with 𝑟𝑓). Hence, (12) 
becomes: 
𝑌 = 𝛷𝐿𝑓
𝛾+𝛿 + 𝛹𝐿𝑢
𝜀+𝜂
.      (12′) 
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The 𝑟’s are in the numerator and the 𝑤’s are in the denominator. And, it appears that  an increase in 𝑟𝑓 
(or 𝑟𝑢) will raise 𝑌𝑓 (or 𝑌𝑢) while an increase in 𝑤𝑓 (or 𝑤𝑢) will lower 𝑌𝑓 (or 𝑌𝑢), keeping always total 
output, 𝑌, constant in line with (1′): 𝑑𝑌 𝑑ℎ⁄ = 0. 
To appreciate these comparative statics, let us see how the changes in labor affect output. If, 0 < 𝑣 < 1 
and: 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓 + 𝐿𝑢 = 𝑣𝐿 + (1 − 𝑣)𝐿,      (15) 
(12′) obtains the form: 
𝑌 = 𝛷(𝑣𝐿)𝛾+𝛿 + 𝛹[(1 − 𝑣)𝐿]𝜀+𝜂      (12′′) 
providing the derivative: 
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑣
= 𝑣−1[(𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿ℎ − (𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣𝜀+𝜂(1 − ℎ)]𝑌,      (16) 
which has the sign of the bracketed term. So, an increase in the part of labor employed officially, will 
raise or lower 𝑌 and hence, total labor productivity, depending on whether 𝑌𝑓 >
[(𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣𝜀+𝜂 (𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿⁄ ]𝑌𝑢 or 𝑌𝑓 < [(𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣
𝜀+𝜂 (𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿⁄ ]𝑌𝑢, respectively. To appreciate the 
improvement/deterioration of overall labor productivity but constancy of ℎ in response to a change in 
𝑣, note that from (12′′): 
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑌
𝐿
      (17) 
regardless returns to scale. This reflects the cost-minimization presumed through the use of output 
expansion paths above. It reflects the presence of technical efficiency in either sector ex hypothesi. 
Consequently, the better/worse overall labor productivity should be related to allocative efficiency 
considerations. And, as soon as it is better or worse depending on whether 𝑌𝑓 >
[(𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣𝜀+𝜂 (𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿⁄ ]𝑌𝑢 or 𝑌𝑓 < [(𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣
𝜀+𝜂 (𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿⁄ ]𝑌𝑢, respectively, and the increase 
in 𝑣 leaves unchanged these inequalities, overall productivity is augmented/impaired because too much 
labor was employed unofficially/officially before this change in 𝑣.  
Consequently, the comparative statics surrounding (12′) above, and a Laffer curve, = 𝜏?̂? = 𝜏𝑌𝑓 +
𝜏𝑝𝑌𝑢 = [𝜏ℎ + 𝑝(1 − ℎ)]𝑌 , become meaningful, operative, only in the presence of allocative 
inefficiency, where 𝑇 is total tax revenue. From (13) and (14), the Laffer curve may be rewritten 
either as: 
𝜏?̂? = 𝜏𝛷𝐿𝑓
𝛾+𝛿 + 𝜏𝑝𝛹𝐿𝑢
𝜀+𝜂
      (18) 
or from (12′′): 
𝜏?̂? = 𝜏𝛷(𝑣𝐿)𝛾+𝛿 + 𝜏𝑝𝛹[(1 − 𝑣)𝐿]𝜀+𝜂.      (18′) 
In any case, the Laffer curve obtains a maximum at a 𝜏 < 1 if decreasing returns to scale are exhibited 
in at least one of the two sectors of the economy, i.e. if 𝛾 + 𝛿 < 1 and/or 𝜀 + 𝜂 < 1, ceteris paribus. 
And, (18′) indicates that given 𝜏 and ℎ, an increase in 𝑟𝑓 (or 𝑟𝑢) raises 𝑌 and thereby 𝑇 by increasing 𝑌𝑓 
(or 𝑌𝑢) while an increase in 𝑤𝑓 (or 𝑤𝑢) lowers 𝑌 and thereby 𝑇 by decreasing 𝑌𝑓 (or 𝑌𝑢). These are all 
comparative statics under disturbed allocative optimum. This is the reason all derivatives of 𝑇 are 
positive. That an increase, for instance, in 𝑌𝑢 will increase 𝑇, cannot be explained differently than by 
ascribing it to improved allocative efficiency in the official sector vis a vis this sector’s pre-tax-increase 
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status. Given technical efficiency, allocative efficiency reaches its maximum at the peak of the Laffer 
curve, which also marks the optimum 𝑌𝑓 − 𝑌𝑢 mix. 
Hidden labor takes away the subsidy to leisure induced by the tax in the official economy. Given an 
inelastic labor supply in the overall economy, the subsidy to leisure in the official sector becomes 
subsidy to work hidden and the welfare cost of taxation in the overall economy is always zero. So, 
given (16) and (18′), to have: 
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑣
= 𝑣−1𝜏[(𝛾 + 𝛿)𝑣𝛾+𝛿ℎ − 𝑝(𝜀 + 𝜂)𝑣𝜀+𝜂(1 − ℎ)]𝑌. 
that is, to be output and tax-revenue augmenting the channeling of more labor in the official economy, 
it must be because of the increased productivity of labor in this sector relative to productivity in the 
hidden sector. Conversely, increasing taxation reduces labor availability in the official sector and 
enhances it in the hidden one, prompting subsequently increases in 𝑤𝑓 and decreases in 𝑤𝑢 to preserve 
technical efficiency, and increasing in turn 𝑣 as a net result until the peak of the Laffer curve is 
reached. Indeed, the inequalities determining the sign of 𝑑𝑌 𝑑𝑣⁄  apply also to the sign of 𝑑𝑇 𝑑𝑣⁄  given 
that the term accompanying 𝑌𝑢 in these inequalities is now multiplied only by 𝑝. And, the adjustment 
process implied by them is reinforced by developments in the goods markets whereby the discrepancy 
between official and unofficial output is widened after an increase of 𝜏 and the rise in 𝑣 serves as a 
means of restoring the price-gap at its pre-tax-increase level. This “relative-price-adjustment” (rather 
than price stabilization) part of the overall adjustment process induces one to think whether money 
stock manipulations instead of tax rate changes might be used to foster allocative efficiency. 
Indeed, from (3) and (12′′): 
𝑀 = [𝑏ℎ + 𝑘(1 − ℎ)]{𝛷(𝑣𝐿)𝛾+𝛿 + 𝛹[(1 − 𝑣)𝐿]𝜀+𝜂} − 𝑒𝑟 
It follows that: 
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑣
= [𝑏ℎ + 𝑘(1 − ℎ)]
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑣
, 
which just says that more 𝑀 is needed to accommodate the increased 𝑌 brought about by the increased 
𝑣. And, disregarding for convenience the term 𝑒𝑟 from (3), it is true that 𝑇 = [𝜏ℎ + 𝑝(1 − ℎ)]𝑌 <
𝑀 = [𝑏ℎ + 𝑘(1 − ℎ)]𝑌, or that: 
𝜏ℎ + 𝑝(1 − ℎ) < 𝑏ℎ + 𝑘(1 − ℎ),      (19) 
which is the optimal combination of policy instruments towards technical and allocative efficiency 
given ℎ. It follows that 𝜏 < 𝑏 to the extent that 𝑝 ≤ 𝑘 as is expected to the case when steady state is 
approached given that there, 𝑝 = 0. Consequently, to foster technical-cum-allocative efficiency, the tax 
rate in the official economy should be less than the income elasticity of money demand in this economy 
independently of returns to scale. And, what 𝜏 < 𝑏  really means as a policy rule against debt 
accumulation is that it helps increase the denominator of the debt-to-income ratio and decrease the 
numerator by improving structural efficiency. At steady state, 𝜏 = 𝑏 the debt is completely monetized, 
the Laffer curve is at its peak, and efficiency and hence, the mix 𝑌𝑓 − 𝑌𝑢 are optimal. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
It may sound strange to be arguing in favour of taxation, which recently, for example, Orsi et al. (2014) 
consider it to be the driving force towards underground activities in general in Italy. But equally 
persuasive not only for Italy but for the entire OECD, is Bovi’s (2002, p. 2) conclusion that: “the 
underground economy [is] positively correlated mainly with institutional failures and, to a lesser extent, 
with taxation and market regulations.”4 Whichever may be the case, the point is that the underground 
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economy is an inescapable and growth-conducive for some (see e.g. Voicu 2012) socioeconomic 
reality and that policymaking should be aiming at handling this economy as one more policy 
instrument to the benefit of the overall economy rather than as a public enemy. Dabla-Norris and 
Feltenstein (2005) are an example of those who do recognize that the optimal taxation has to be 
consistent with such a perception of the micro- and macro-economy. Much more so when tax evasion 
is used by politicians to conceal the real tax burden (see e.g. Battaglini and Coate 2008) in pork-barrel 
spending deliberations instead of social-welfare enhancing public-good provision (see e.g. Dell’Anno 
and Dollery 2014).  
 
It is for such perhaps arguments that the rule 𝜏 < 𝑏 was found in the last section to be sensible only if  
𝑝 ≤ 𝑘 given that the unofficial economy is assumed herein to be one that finally remains untaxed. It is 
an assumption made for analytical convenience against the caveat that tax evasion and underground 
economy do not necessarily coincide. But, although inequality 𝑝 ≤ 𝑘 is the product of such an 
assumption, it nevertheless reflects the standard proposition that a government should be trying to 
control rather than ban unofficial activities altogether. It does so by coming out of the quest for 
improved structural efficiency, suggesting that the extent and content of hidden sector control should 
be designed aiming at improving structural efficiency; even more so under the pressure of a public debt 
problem. The alleged subjugation of the non-observed sector as a means of enhancing the tax base and 
confronting a debt problem is not at all a profound policy goal, since it disregards the fact that the 
enlargement of the tax base is a matter of incentives. As very instructively Bierbrauer and Boyer (2010) 
demonstrate, a Laffer curve should be interpreted to be the second-best Pareto frontier which 
incorporates incentive constraints; a Laffer curve in the Laffer-Gutmann sense one should add. 
 
The “anti-austerity” character of the proposed policy off steady-state, that is reliance more on money 
stock manipulation than on taxation to handle public debt accumulation, derives from such Laffer curve 
considerations acknowledging the equalizing character of the non-observed economy. This economy 
may be an equilibrium phenomenon à la Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014) only at steady-state, at the peak 
of the Laffer curve, but once the overall economy is off steady-state, the hidden economy corroborates 
keeping at equilibrium the overall economy. Borrowing from Clower (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968) 
analysis, quantities adjust faster than prices in the official sector towards a “deviation-amplifying 
feedback loop, which hidden economy’s price flexibility comes to turn the overall economy loop into a 
“deviation-counteracting” one. Of course, a genuine macroeconomic model of official-cum-unofficial 
economy effective and notional demand is needed to verify this conclusion, which the microeconomics 
of structural efficiency suggest, but this is also the conclusion to which the failure of austerity policies 
leads. These policies per se plus the accompanying measures of structural reform simply fail to 
appreciate the vital role of the hidden economy as one ensuring Walrasian equilibrium over the course 
of the business cycle. Worse yet, when they try to limit hidden economy, disregarding the “fact” that it 
is this precisely economy that ensures the laissez faire character of the system.5  
 
Notes 
 
1 For a recent addition to this discussion, see the Fall 2014 issue of the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives with the “Symposium: Tax Enforcement and Compliance”.     
2 For example, according to Neck et al. (2011, 104) attention should be paid to that “a more complex 
tax system with more possibilities of legal tax avoidance implies, ceteris paribus, a smaller labor 
supply in the shadow economy”. See also note 4. 
3 It is corruption mostly to blame for the unofficial economy: “Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are 
associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more 
unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of 
bureaucracy and corruption.” (Friedman et al. 2000, Abstract). 
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4 For example, Auriol and Warlters (2005) document for 64 developing countries that raising barriers to 
entry in the official economy is consistent with a deliberate and successful government policy for 
raising tax revenue. See also note 3. 
5 Many, like Kanniainen et al. (2004, 1), are addressing the ethical dimension of the hidden economy in 
that: “Abstaining from participation of financing the public goods, those visiting the illicit markets 
exert a fiscal externality on honest consumers.” But, isn’t the subsequent smaller volume of public 
goods compensated by the hidden-economy supply of private goods to the “honest” consumer? And, 
couldn’t this be “fine” by this consumer, implying that ethical glossary is only a government 
propaganda tool to secure its finances? The answer would be negative only if hidden economy 
developments cease to perform their role as overall economy equalizers over the course of the business 
cycle. 
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